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ABSTRACT
Radhi. Nungsari Ahmad.  Ph.D., Purdue University, December 1994. The All Pay.
Common Value Auction As a Model of Contests. Major Professors: Marie Thursby
and Daniel Kovenock.
An all pay, common value auction is proposed as a model of contests. The
common value of the prize is ex-ante unknown, but each contestant has private
information about its true value. These private information are affiliated. Unlike in
the symmetric. winner pay a.uction  model of Milgrom and Weber  (1982). the affilia-
tion assumption is not sufficient to ensure t,he  existence of an increasing equilibrium
bid. The all pay a.uction  is shown t,o  require a stronger condit,ion; a joint restrict,ion
on the expected valuation of the prize and the beliefs bidders have of each other’s
estimates of the prize. Equilibrium bids are increasing if there is not too strong
a. degree of affiliation and the expected value of the prize is increasing sufficiently
rapidly in each bidder’s type. When there exists an increasing equilibrium, the
equilibrium is unique even in the asymmetric bidder case. The results extend to
the all pay. private values auction which is obt,ained as a special case. The all pay
and winner pay auctions are then compared at the symmetric equilibrium. 115th in-
creasing equilibrium bids, it is possible to order the expected revenues from the two
auctions. This was first proposed by Amann  and Leininger (1994). It is shown by
way of an example that a~hhough  sufficient, monot,onicity  of equilibrium bids is not
a necessa.ry condition for the ordering. Without, monot,onicity,  however. comparing
the two auctions can lead to conclusions which are not robust. Two examples are
provided to compa.re the role of affilia.tion  and the effects of nonmonotonicity in the
all pay and winner pay auctions.
11. INTRODUCTION
The all pa.y auction has long been used to model economic contests. Among the
contests modeled in the literature are rent-seeking and lobbying (Tullock. 1980;
Hillman  and Samet. 1987:  Hillman  and Riley, 19S9: Baye, Kovenock  a.nd  De Vries.
1993). patent races (Fudenberg. Gilbert and Tirole, 1983; Harris and Vickers,  1985).
bribery games (Lien. 1990). and corporate control (Harris and Raviv. 1988). Other
interesting examples of contests include the arms races (Shubik. 19il;  Schelling.
1980). and the various contests for mates, territories and survival in the animal
kingdom so aptly described in Maynard Smith (1982). While the a.uction  literature
itself is large, t,here  has not been a systema.tic  treatment of t,he  all pay version until
recently, despite its widespread use in modeling contests.
The defining characteristic of contests is that participants have to expend some
resources t.0  participate. Depending on the contest, the resources expended may
be effort levels. bribes. investment or expenditure levels, or even the amount of
time. The determina.tion  of the winner also varies with the particular type of
contest. Generally., whether one wins the contest or not depends on the amount
of resources expended relative to other contestants. There are contests where the
outcome is stochastic but the probability of winning is increasing in a contestant’s
level of commitment. These are termed imperfectly discriminating contests in the
1itera.ture.l The classic models of rent seeking (Tullock, 1980) and R&D  races
’ Hillman  and Riley ( 1989) used the term to describe their model where ‘. . ..the
process cannot discriminate among contenders to designate the winner with cer-
tainty. but ra.ther  the outcome of the contest is an assignment to each agent of a
probability- that he will be the winner.” This is not to be confused with the term.
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